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ABSTRACT
Multi-agent settings are quickly gathering importance in machine
learning. This includes a plethora of recent work on deep multi-
agent reinforcement learning, but also can be extended to hierar-
chical reinforcement learning, generative adversarial networks and
decentralised optimization. In all these settings the presence of mul-
tiple learning agents renders the training problem non-stationary
and often leads to unstable training or undesired final results. We
present Learning with Opponent-Learning Awareness (LOLA), a
method in which each agent shapes the anticipated learning of
the other agents in the environment. The LOLA learning rule in-
cludes an additional term that accounts for the impact of one agent’s
policy on the anticipated parameter update of the other agents. Pre-
liminary results show that the encounter of two LOLA agents leads
to the emergence of tit-for-tat and therefore cooperation in the
iterated prisoners’ dilemma (IPD), while independent learning does
not. In this domain, LOLA also receives higher payouts compared
to a naive learner, and is robust against exploitation by higher order
gradient-based methods. Applied to infinitely repeated matching
pennies, LOLA agents converge to the Nash equilibrium. In a round
robin tournament we show that LOLA agents can successfully shape
the learning of a range of multi-agent learning algorithms from
literature, resulting in the highest average returns on the IPD. We
also show that the LOLA update rule can be efficiently calculated
using an extension of the likelihood ratio policy gradient estimator,
making the method suitable for model-free reinforcement learning.
This method thus scales to large parameter and input spaces and
nonlinear function approximators. We also apply LOLA to a grid
world task with an embedded social dilemma using deep recurrent
policies and opponent modelling. Again, by explicitly considering
the learning of the other agent, LOLA agents learn to cooperate out
of self-interest. Our code is available at github.com/alshedivat/lola.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Due to the advent of deep reinforcement learning (RL) methods that
allow the study of many agents in rich environments, multi-agent
RL has flourished in recent years. However, most of this recent
work considers fully cooperative settings [13, 14, 34] and emergent
communication in particular [11, 12, 22, 32, 40]. Considering future
applications ofmulti-agent RL, such as self-driving cars, it is obvious
that many of these will be only partially cooperative and contain
elements of competition and conflict.
The human ability to maintain cooperation in a variety of com-
plex social settings has been vital for the success of human societies.
Emergent reciprocity has been observed even in strongly adversar-
ial settings such as wars [1], making it a quintessential and robust
feature of human life.
In the future, artificial learning agents are likely to take an active
part in human society, interacting both with other learning agents
and humans in complex partially competitive settings. Failing to
develop learning algorithms that lead to emergent reciprocity in
these artificial agents would lead to disastrous outcomes.
How reciprocity can emerge among a group of learning, self-
interested, reward maximizing RL agents is thus a question both
of theoretical interest and of practical importance. Game theory
has a long history of studying the learning outcomes in games that
contain cooperative and competitive elements. In particular, the
tension between cooperation and defection is commonly studied in
the iterated prisoners’ dilemma. In this game, selfish interests can
lead to an outcome that is overall worse for all participants, while
cooperation maximizes social welfare, one measure of which is the
sum of rewards for all agents.
Interestingly, in the simple setting of an infinitely repeated pris-
oners’ dilemma with discounting, randomly initialised RL agents
pursuing independent gradient descent on the exact value func-
tion learn to defect with high probability. This shows that current
state-of-the-art learning methods in deep multi-agent RL can lead
to agents that fail to cooperate reliably even in simple social set-
tings. One well-known shortcoming is that they fail to consider
the learning process of the other agents and simply treat the other
agent as a static part of the environment [19].
As a step towards reasoning over the learning behaviour of
other agents in social settings, we propose Learning with Opponent-
Learn-ing Awareness (LOLA). The LOLA learning rule includes an
additional term that accounts for the impact of one agent’s policy
on the learning step of the other agents. For convenience we use
the word ‘opponents’ to describe the other agents, even though
the method is not limited to zero-sum games and can be applied in
the general-sum setting. We show that this additional term, when
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applied by both agents, leads to emergent reciprocity and coop-
eration in the iterated prisoners’ dilemma (IPD). Experimentally
we also show that in the IPD, each agent is incentivised to switch
from naive learning to LOLA, while there are no additional gains
in attempting to exploit LOLA with higher order gradient terms.
This suggests that within the space of local, gradient-based learn-
ing rules both agents using LOLA is a stable equilibrium. This is
further supported by the good performance of the LOLA agent in a
round-robin tournament, where it successfully manages to shape
the learning of a number of multi-agent learning algorithms from
literature. This leads to the overall highest average return on the
IPD and good performance on Iterated Matching Pennies (IMP).
We also present a version of LOLA adopted to the deep RL setting
using likelihood ratio policy gradients, making LOLA scalable to
settings with high dimensional input and parameter spaces.
We evaluate the policy gradient version of LOLA on the IPD and
iterated matching pennies (IMP), a simplified version of rock-paper-
scissors. We show that LOLA leads to cooperation with high social
welfare, while independent policy gradients, a standard multi-agent
RL approach, does not. The policy gradient finding is consistent
with prior work, e.g., Sandholm and Crites [39]. We also extend
LOLA to settings where the opponent policy is unknown and needs
to be inferred from observations of the opponent’s behaviour.
Finally, we apply LOLA with and without opponent modelling
to a grid-world task with an embedded underlying social dilemma.
This task has temporally extended actions and therefore requires
high dimensional recurrent policies for agents to learn to recipro-
cate. Again, cooperation emerges in this task when using LOLA,
even when the opponent’s policy is unknown and needs to be
estimated.
2 RELATEDWORK
The study of general-sum games has a long history in game theory
and evolution. Many papers address the iterated prisoners’ dilemma
(IPD) in particular, including the seminal work on the topic by Ax-
elrod [1]. This work popularised tit-for-tat (TFT), a strategy in
which an agent cooperates on the first move and then copies the
opponent’s most recent move, as an effective and simple strategy.
A number of methods in multi-agent RL aim to achieve conver-
gence in self-play and rationality in sequential, general sum games.
Seminal work includes the family of WoLF algorithms [3], which
uses different learning rates depending on whether an agent is
winning or losing, joint-action-learners (JAL), and AWESOME [9].
Unlike LOLA, these algorithms typically have well understood
convergence behaviour given an appropriate set of constraints.
However, none of these algorithm have the ability to shape the
learning behaviour of the opponents in order to obtain higher pay-
outs at convergence. AWESOME aims to learn the equilibria of the
one-shot game, a subset of the equilibria of the iterated game.
Detailed studies have analysed the dynamics of JALs in general
sum settings: This includes work by Uther and Veloso [43] in zero-
sum settings and by Claus and Boutilier [8] in cooperative settings.
Sandholm and Crites [39] study the dynamics of independent Q-
learning in the IPD under a range of different exploration schedules
and function approximators. Wunder et al. [45] and Zinkevich
et al. [47] explicitly study the convergence dynamics and equilibria
of learning in iterated games. Unlike LOLA, these papers do not
propose novel learning rules.
Littman [26] propose a method that assumes each opponent ei-
ther to be a friend, i.e., fully cooperative, or foe, i.e., fully adversarial.
Instead, LOLA considers general sum games.
By comparing a set of models with different history lengths,
Chakraborty and Stone [7] propose a method to learn a best re-
sponse to memory bounded agents with fixed policies. In contrast,
LOLA assumes learning agents, which effectively correspond to
unbounded memory policies.
Brafman and Tennenholtz [4] introduce the solution concept
of an efficient learning equilibrium (ELE), in which neither side
is encouraged to deviate from the learning rule. The algorithm
they propose applies to settings where all Nash equilibria can be
computed and enumerated; LOLA does not require either of these
assumptions.
By contrast, most work in deep multi-agent RL focuses on fully
cooperative or zero-sum settings, in which learning progress is
easier to evaluate, [13, 14, 34] and emergent communication in par-
ticular [11, 12, 22, 32, 40]. As an exception, Leibo et al. [24] analyse
the outcomes of independent learning in general sum settings using
feedforward neural networks as policies. Lowe et al. [27] propose a
centralised actor-critic architecture for efficient training in these
general sum environments. However, none of these methods explic-
itly reasons about the learning behaviour of other agents. Lanctot
et al. [21] generalise the ideas of game-theoretic best-response-
style algorithms, such as NFSP [17]. In contrast to LOLA, these
best-response algorithms assume a given set of opponent policies,
rather than attempting to shape the learning of the other agents.
The problem setting and approach of Lerer and Peysakhovich
[25] is closest to ours. They directly generalise tit-for-tat to complex
environments using deep RL. The authors explicitly train a fully
cooperative and a defecting policy for both agents and then con-
struct a tit-for-tat policy that switches between these two in order
to encourage the opponent to cooperate. Similar in spirit to this
work, Munoz de Cote and Littman [33] propose a Nash equilibrium
algorithm for repeated stochastic games that attempts to find the
egalitarian equilibrium by switching between competitive and co-
operative strategies. A similar idea underlies M-Qubed, [10], which
balances best-response, cautious and optimistic learning biases.
Reciprocity and cooperation are not emergent properties of the
learning rules in these algorithms but rather directly coded into
the algorithm via heuristics, limiting their generality.
Our work also relates to opponent modelling, such as fictitious
play [5] and action-sequence prediction [29, 36].Mealing and Shapiro
[30] also propose a method that finds a policy based on predicting
the future action of a memory bounded opponent. Furthermore,
Hernandez-Leal and Kaisers [18] directly model the distribution
over opponents. While these methods model the opponent strategy,
or distribution thereof, and use look-ahead to find optimal response
policies, they do not address the learning dynamics of opponents.
For further details we refer the reader to excellent reviews on the
subject [6, 19].
By contrast, Zhang and Lesser [46] carry out policy prediction
under one-step learning dynamics. However, the opponents’ policy
updates are assumed to be given and only used to learn a best
response to the anticipated updated parameters. By contrast, a
LOLA agent directly shapes the policy updates of all opponents
in order to maximise its own reward. Differentiating through the
opponent’s learning step, which is unique to LOLA, is crucial for
the emergence of tit-for-tat and reciprocity. To the best of our
knowledge, LOLA is the first method that aims to shape the learning
of other agents in a multi-agent RL setting.
With LOLA, each agent differentiates through the opponents’
policy update. Similar ideas were proposed by Metz et al. [31],
whose training method for generative adversarial networks dif-
ferentiates through multiple update steps of the opponent. Their
method relies on an end-to-end differentiable loss function, and
thus does not work in the general RL setting. However, the overall
results are similar: differentiating through the opponent’s learning
process stabilises the training outcome in a zero sum setting.
Outside of purely computational studies the emergence of co-
operation and defection in RL settings has also been studied and
compared to human data [20].
3 NOTATION
Our work assumes a multi-agent task that is commonly described as
a stochastic game G, specified by a tuple G = ⟨S,U , P , r ,Z ,O,n,γ ⟩.
Here n agents, a ∈ A ≡ {1, ...,n}, choose actions, ua ∈ U , and s ∈ S
is the state of the environment. The joint action u ∈ U ≡ U n leads
to a state transition based on the transition function P(s ′ |s, u) :
S × U × S → [0, 1]. The reward functions ra (s, u) : S × U → R
specify the rewards and γ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor.
We further define the discounted future return from time t on-
ward as Rat =
∑∞
l=0 γ
l rat+l for each agent, a. In a naive approach,
each agent maximises its total discounted return in expectation
separately. This can be done with policy gradient methods [42] such
as REINFORCE [44]. Policy gradient methods update an agent’s
policy, parameterised by θa , by performing gradient ascent on an
estimate of the expected discounted total reward E
[
Ra0
]
.
By convention, bold lowercase letters denote column vectors.
4 METHODS
In this section, we review the naive learner’s strategy and introduce
the LOLA learning rule. We first derive the update rules when
agents have access to exact gradients and Hessians of their expected
discounted future return in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. In Section 4.3, we
derive the learning rules purely based on policy gradients, thus
removing access to exact gradients and Hessians. This renders
LOLA suitable for deep RL. However, we still assume agents have
access to opponents’ policy parameters in policy gradient-based
LOLA. Next, in Section 4.4, we incorporate opponent modeling into
the LOLA learning rule, such that each LOLA agent only infers the
opponent’s policy parameter from experience. Finally, we discuss
higher order LOLA in Section 4.5.
For simplicity, here we assume the number of agents is n = 2
and display the update rules for agent 1 only. The same derivation
holds for arbitrary numbers of agents.
4.1 Naive Learner
Suppose each agent’s policyπa is parameterised byθa andV a (θ1,θ2)
is the expected total discounted return for agent a as a function
of both agents’ policy parameters (θ1,θ2). A Naive Learner (NL)
iteratively optimises for its own expected total discounted return,
such that at the ith iteration, θai is updated to θ
a
i+1 according to
θ1i+1 = argmaxθ 1 V
1(θ1,θ2i )
θ2i+1 = argmaxθ 2 V
2(θ1i ,θ2).
In the reinforcement learning setting, agents do not have access to
{V 1,V 2} over all parameter values. Instead, we assume that agents
only have access to the function values and gradients at (θ1i ,θ2i ).
Using this information the naive learners apply the gradient ascent
update rule f 1nl:
θ1i+1 = θ
1
i + f
1
nl(θ1i ,θ2i ),
f 1nl = ∇θ 1i V
1(θ1i ,θ2i ) · δ , (4.1)
where δ is the step size.
4.2 Learning with Opponent Learning
Awareness
A LOLA learner optimises its return under one step look-ahead
of opponent learning: Instead of optimizing the expected return
under the current parameters, V 1(θ1i ,θ2i ), a LOLA agent optimises
V 1(θ1i ,θ2i + ∆θ2i ), which is the expected return after the opponent
updates its policy with one naive learning step, ∆θ2i . Going forward
we drop the subscript i for clarity. Assuming small ∆θ2, a first-order
Taylor expansion results in:
V 1(θ1,θ2 + ∆θ2) ≈ V 1(θ1,θ2) + (∆θ2)T ∇θ 2V 1(θ1,θ2). (4.2)
The LOLA objective (4.2) differs from prior work, e.g., Zhang
and Lesser [46], that predicts the opponent’s policy parameter up-
date and learns a best response. LOLA learners attempt to actively
influence the opponent’s future policy update, and explicitly dif-
ferentiate through the ∆θ2 with respect to θ1. Since LOLA focuses
on this shaping of the learning direction of the opponent, the de-
pendency of ∇θ 2V 1(θ1,θ2) on θ1 is dropped during the backward
pass. Investigation of how differentiating through this term would
affect the learning outcomes is left for future work.
By substituting the opponent’s naive learning step:
∆θ2 = ∇θ 2V 2(θ1,θ2) · η (4.3)
into (4.2) and taking the derivative of (4.2) with respect to θ1, we
obtain our LOLA learning rule:
θ1i+1 = θ
1
i + f
1
lola(θ1i ,θ2i ),
which includes a second order correction term
f 1lola(θ1,θ2) = ∇θ 1V 1(θ1,θ2) · δ
+
(
∇θ 2V 1(θ1,θ2)
)T ∇θ 1∇θ 2V 2(θ1,θ2) · δη, (4.4)
where the step sizes δ ,η are for the first and second order updates.
Exact LOLA and NL agents (LOLA-Ex and NL-Ex) have access to the
gradients and Hessians of {V 1,V 2} at the current policy parameters
(θ1i ,θ2i ) and can evaluate (4.1) and (4.4) exactly.
Figure 1: a) shows the probability of cooperation in the iterated prisoners dilemma (IPD) at the end of 50 training runs for
both agents as a function of state under naive learning (NL-Ex) and b) displays the results for LOLA-Ex when using the exact
gradients of the value function. c) shows the normalised discounted return for both agents in NL-Ex vs. NL-Ex and LOLA-Ex vs.
LOLA-Ex, with the exact gradient. d) plots the normalised discounted return for both agents in NL-PG vs. NL-PG and LOLA-PG
vs. LOLA-PG, with policy gradient approximation. We see that NL-Ex leads to DD, resulting in an average reward of ca. −2. In
contrast, the LOLA-Ex agents play tit-for-tat in b): When in the last move agent 1 defected and agent 2 cooperated (DC, green
points), most likely in the next move agent 1 will cooperate and agent 2 will defect, indicated by a concentration of the green
points in the bottom right corner. Similarly, the yellow points (CD), are concentrated in the top left corner. While the results
for the NL-PG and LOLA-PG with policy gradient approximation are more noisy, they are qualitatively similar. Best viewed
in colour.
4.3 Learning via Policy Gradient
When agents do not have access to exact gradients or Hessians,
we derive the update rules fnl, pg and flola, pg based on approxi-
mations of the derivatives in (4.1) and (4.4). Denote an episode of
horizon T as τ = (s0,u10,u20, r10 , r20 , ..., r1T , r2T ) and its corresponding
discounted return for agent a at timestep t as Rat (τ ) =
∑T
l=t γ
l−t ral .
The expected episodic return conditioned on the agents’ policies
(π 1,π 2), ER10(τ ) and ER20(τ ), approximate V 1 and V 2 respectively,
as do the gradients and Hessians.
∇θ 1 ER10(τ ) follows from the policy gradient derivation:
∇θ 1 ER10(τ ) = E
[
R10(τ )∇θ 1 logπ 1(τ )
]
= E
[∑T
t=0 ∇θ 1 logπ
1(u1t |st ) ·
∑T
l=t
γ l r1l
]
= E
[∑T
t=0 ∇θ 1 logπ
1(u1t |st )γ t
(
R1t (τ ) − b(st )
) ]
,
where b(st ) is a baseline for variance reduction. Then the update
rule fnl, pg for the policy gradient-based naive learner (NL-PG) is
f 1nl, pg = ∇θ 1 ER10(τ ) · δ . (4.5)
For the LOLA update, we derive the following estimator of the
second-order term in (4.4) based on policy gradients. The deriva-
tion (omitted) closely resembles the standard proof of the policy
gradient theorem, exploiting the fact that agents sample actions
independently. We further note that this second order term is exact
in expectation:
∇θ 1∇θ 2 ER20(τ )
= E
[
R20(τ )∇θ 1 logπ 1(τ )
(∇θ 2 logπ 2(τ ))T ]
= E
[∑T
t=0 γ
t r2t ·
(∑t
l=0 ∇θ 1 logπ
1(u1l |sl )
)
(∑t
l=0 ∇θ 2 logπ
2(u2l |sl )
)T ]
. (4.6)
The complete LOLA update using policy gradients (LOLA-PG) is
f 1lola, pg = ∇θ 1 ER10(τ ) · δ+(∇θ 2 ER10(τ ))T ∇θ 1∇θ 2 ER20(τ ) · δη. (4.7)
4.4 LOLA with Opponent Modeling
Both versions (4.4) and (4.7) of LOLA learning assume that each
agent has access to the exact parameters of the opponent. However,
in adversarial settings the opponent’s parameters are typically ob-
scured and have to be inferred from the opponent’s state-action
trajectories. Our proposed opponent modeling is similar to be-
havioral cloning [2, 38]. Instead of accessing agent 2’s true policy
parameters θ2, agent 1 models the opponent’s behavior with θˆ2,
where θˆ2 is estimated from agent 2’s trajectories using maximum
likelihood:
θˆ2 = argmax
θ 2
∑
t
logπθ 2 (u2t |st ). (4.8)
Then, θˆ2 replaces θ2 in the LOLA update rule, both for the exact
version (4.4) using the value function and the gradient based ap-
proximation (4.7). We compare the performance of policy-gradient
based LOLA agents (4.7) with and without opponent modeling in
our experiments. In particular we can obtain θˆ2 using the past
action-observation history. In our experiments we incrementally
fit to the most recent data in order to address the non-stationarity
of the opponent.
4.5 Higher-Order LOLA
By substituting the naive learning rule (4.3) into the LOLA objec-
tive (4.2), the LOLA learning rule so far assumes that the opponent
is a naive learner. We call this setting first-order LOLA, which cor-
responds to the first-order learning rule of the opponent agent.
However, we can also consider a higher-order LOLA agent that
assumes the opponent applies a first-order LOLA learning rule, thus
Figure 2: a) the probability of playing heads in the iterated matching pennies (IMP) at the end of 50 independent training runs
for both agents as a function of state under naive learning NL-Ex. b) the results of LOLA-Ex when using the exact gradients
of the value function. c) the normalised discounted return for both agents in NL-Ex vs. NL-Ex and LOLA-Ex vs. LOLA-Ex with
exact gradient. d) the normalised discounted return for both agents in NL-PG vs. NL-PG and LOLA-PG vs. LOLA-PGwith policy
gradient approximation. We can see in a) that NL-Ex results in near deterministic strategies, indicated by the accumulation of
points in the corners. These strategies are easily exploitable by other deterministic strategies leading to unstable training and
high variance in the reward per step in c). In contrast, LOLA agents learn to play the only Nash strategy, 50%/50%, leading to
low variance in the reward per step. One interpretation is that LOLA agents anticipate that exploiting a deviation from Nash
increases their immediate return, but also renders them more exploitable by the opponent’s next learning step. Best viewed
in colour.
replacing (4.3). This leads to third-order derivatives in the learning
rule. While the third-order terms are typically difficult to compute
using policy gradient method, due to high variance, when the exact
value function is available it is tractable. We examine the benefits
of higher-order LOLA in our experiments.
5 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we summarise the settings where we compare the
learning behavior of NL and LOLA agents. The first setting (Sec. 5.1)
consists of two classic infinitely iterated games, the iterated prison-
ers dilemma (IPD), [28] and iterated matching pennies (IMP) [23].
Each round in these two environments requires a single action
from each agent. We can obtain the discounted future return of
each player given both players’ policies, which leads to exact policy
updates for NL and LOLA agents. The second setting (Sec. 5.2),
Coin Game, a more difficult two-player environment, where each
round requires the agents to take a sequence of actions and exact
discounted future reward can not be calculated. The policy of each
player is parameterised with a deep recurrent neural network.
In the policy gradient experiments with LOLA, we assume off-
line learning, i.e., agents play many (batch-size) parallel episodes
using their latest policies. Policies remain unchanged within each
episode, with learning happening between episodes. One setting
in which this kind of offline learning naturally arises is when poli-
cies are trained on real-world data. For example, in the case of
autonomous cars, the data from a fleet of cars is used to periodically
train and dispatch new policies.
5.1 Iterated Games
Wefirst review the two iterated games, the IPD and IMP, and explain
how we can model iterated games as a memory-1 two-agent MDP.
C D
C (-1, -1) (-3, 0)
D (0, -3) (-2, -2)
Table 1: Payoff matrix of prisoners’ dilemma.
Table 1 shows the per-step payoffmatrix of the prisoners’ dilemma.
In a single-shot prisoners’ dilemma, there is only one Nash equi-
librium [15], where both agents defect. In the infinitely iterated
prisoners’ dilemma, the folk theorem [37] shows that there are
infinitely many Nash equilibria. Two notable ones are the always
defect strategy (DD), and tit-for-tat (TFT). In TFT each agent starts
out with cooperation and then repeats the previous action of the
opponent. The average returns per step in self-play are −1 and −2
for TFT and DD respectively.
Matching pennies [16] is a zero-sum game, with per-step payouts
shown in Table 2. This game only has a single mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium which is both players playing 50%/50% heads / tails.
Head Tail
Head (+1, -1) (-1, +1)
Tail (-1, +1) (+1, -1)
Table 2: Payoff matrix of matching pennies.
Agents in both the IPD and IMP can condition their actions
on past history. Agents in an iterated game are endowed with a
memory of length K , i.e., the agents act based on the results of the
last K rounds. Press and Dyson [35] proved that agents with a good
memory-1 strategy can effectively force the iterated game to be
played as memory-1. Thus, we consider memory-1 iterated games.
We model the memory-1 IPD and IMP as a two-agent MRP,
where the state at time 0 is empty, denoted as s0, and at time t ≥ 1
is the joint action from t − 1: st = (u1t−1,u2t−1) for t > 1.
IPD IMP
%TFT R(std) %Nash R(std)
NL-Ex. 20.8 -1.98(0.14) 0.0 0(0.37)
LOLA-Ex. 81.0 -1.06(0.19) 98.8 0(0.02)
NL-PG 20.0 -1.98(0.00) 13.2 0(0.19)
LOLA-PG 66.4 -1.17(0.34) 93.2 0(0.06)
Table 3: We summarise results for NL vs. NL and LOLA vs.
LOLA settings with either exact gradient evaluation (-Ex) or
policy gradient approximation (-PG). Shown is the probabil-
ity of agents playing TFT and Nash for the IPD and IMP
respectively as well as the average reward per step, R, and
standard deviation (std) at the end of training for 50 train-
ing runs.
Each agent’s policy is fully specified by 5 probabilities. For agent
a in the case of the IPD, they are the probability of cooperation
at game start πa (C |s0), and the cooperation probabilities in the
four memories: πa (C |CC), πa (C |CD), πa (C |DC), and πa (C |DD).
By analytically solving the multi-agent MDP we can derive each
agent’s future discounted reward as an analytical function of the
agents’ policies and calculate the exact policy update for both NL-Ex
and LOLA-Ex agents.
We also organise a round-robin tournament where we compare
LOLA-Ex to a number of state-of-the-art multi-agent learning algo-
rithms, both on the and IMP.
5.2 Coin Game
Next, we study LOLA in a more complex setting called Coin Game.
This is a sequential game and the agents’ policies are parametrised
as deep neural networks. Coin Game was first proposed by Lerer
and Peysakhovich [25] as a higher dimensional alternative to the
IPD with multi-step actions. As shown in Figure 3, in this setting
two agents, ‘red’ and ‘blue’, are tasked with collecting coins.
The coins are either blue or red, and appear randomly on the
grid-world. A new coin with random colour and random position
appears after the last one is picked up. Agents pick up coins by
moving onto the position where the coin is located. While every
agent receives a point for picking up a coin of any colour, whenever
an picks up a coin of different colour, the other agent loses 2 points.
As a result, if both agents greedily pick up any coin available,
they receive 0 points in expectation. Since the agents’ policies are
parameterised as a recurrent neural network, one cannot obtain
the future discounted reward as a function of both agents’ policies
in closed form. Policy gradient-based learning is applied for both
NL and LOLA agents in our experiments. We further include ex-
periments of LOLA with opponent modelling (LOLA-OM) in order
to examine the behavior of LOLA agents without access to the
opponent’s policy parameters.
5.3 Training Details
In policy gradient-based NL and LOLA settings, we train agents
with an actor-critic method [41] and parameterise each agent with a
policy actor and -critic for variance reduction during policy updates.
Figure 3: In the Coin Game, two agents, ‘red’ and ‘blue’, get 1
point for picking up any coin. However, the ‘red agent’ loses
2 points when the ‘blue agent’ picks up a red coin and vice
versa. Effectively, this is a world with an embedded social
dilemma where cooperation and defection are temporally
extended.
During training, we use gradient descent with step size, δ , of
0.005 for the actor, 1 for the critic, and the batch size 4000 for rollouts.
The discount rate γ is set to 0.96 for the prisoners’ dilemma and
Coin Game and 0.9 for matching pennies. The high value of γ for
Coin Game and the IPD was chosen in order to allow for long time
horizons, which are known to be required for cooperation. We
found that a lower γ produced more stable learning on IMP.
For Coin Game the agent’s policy architecture is a recurrent
neural network with 32 hidden units and 2 convolutional layers
with 3× 3 filters, stride 1, and ReLU activation for input processing.
The input is presented as a 4-channel grid, with 2 channels encoding
the positions of the 2 agents and 2 channels for the red and blue
coins respectively.
For the tournament, we use baseline algorithms and the corre-
sponding hyperparameter values as provided in the literature [3].
The tournament is played in a round-robin fashion between all
pairs of agents for 1000 episodes, 200 steps each.
6 RESULTS
In this section, we summarise the experimental results. We denote
LOLA and naive agents with exact policy updates as LOLA-Ex and
NL-Ex respectively. We abbreviate LOLA and native agents with
policy updates with LOLA-PG and NL-PG. We aim to answer the
following questions: (1) How do pairs of LOLA-Ex agents behave
in iterated games compared with pairs of NL-Ex agents? (2) Using
policy gradient updates instead, how to LOLA-PG agents and NL-
PG agents behave? (3) How do LOLA-Ex agents fair in a round robin
tournament involving a set of multi-agent learning algorithms from
literature? (4) Does the learning of LOLA-PG agents scale to high-
dimensional settings where the agents’ policies are parameterised
by deep neural networks? (5) Does LOLA-PG maintain its behavior
when replacing access to the exact parameters of the opponent
agent with opponent modeling? (6) Can LOLA agents be exploited
by using higher order gradients, i.e., does LOLA lead to an arms
race of ever higher order corrections or is LOLA / LOLA stable?
We answer the first three questions in Sec. 6.1, the next two
questions in Sec. 6.2, and the last one in Sec. 6.3.
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6.1 Iterated Games
We first compare the behaviors of LOLA agents with NL agents,
with either exact policy updates or policy gradient updates.
Figures 1a and 1b show the policy for both agents at the end of
training under NL-Ex and LOLA-Ex when the agents have access
to exact gradients and Hessians of {V 1,V 2}. Here we consider
the settings of NL-Ex vs. NL-Ex and LOLA-Ex vs. LOLA-Ex. We
study mixed learning of one LOLA-Ex agent vs. an NL-Ex agent in
Section 6.3. Under NL-Ex, the agents learn to defect in all states,
indicated by the accumulation of points in the bottom left corner
of the plot. However, under LOLA-Ex, in most cases the agents
learn TFT. In particular agent 1 cooperates in the starting state
s0, CC and DC , while agent 2 cooperates in s0, CC and CD. As a
result, Figure 1c) shows that the normalised discounted reward1 is
close to −1 for LOLA-Ex vs. LOLA-Ex, corresponding to TFT, while
NL-Ex vs. NL-Ex results in an normalised discounted reward of −2,
corresponding to the fully defective (DD) equilibrium. Figure 1d)
shows the normalised discounted reward for NL-PG and LOLA-PG
where agents learn via policy gradient. LOLA-PG also demonstrates
cooperation while agents defect in NL-PG.
We conduct the same analysis for IMP in Figure 2. In this game,
under naive learning the agents’ strategies fail to converge. In
contrast, under LOLA the agents’ policies converge to the only
Nash equilibrium, playing 50%/50% heads / tails.
Table 3 summarises the numerical results comparing LOLA with
NL agents in both the exact and policy gradient settings in the two
iterated game environments. In the IPD, LOLA agents learn policies
consistent with TFT with a much higher probability and achieve
higher normalised discounted rewards than NL (−1.06 vs −1.98). In
IMP, LOLA agents converge to the Nash equilibrium more stably
while NL agents do not. The difference in stability is illustrated
by the high variance of the normalised discounted returns for NL
agents compared to the low variance under LOLA (0.37 vs 0.02).
In Figure 4 we show the average normalised return of our LOLA-
Ex agent against a set of learning algorithms from the literature.
We find that LOLA-Ex receives the highest normalised return in
1We use following definition for the normalised discounted reward: (1−γ )∑Tt=0 γ t rt .
the IPD, indicating that it successfully shapes the learning outcome
of other algorithms in this general sum setting.
In the IMP, LOLA-Ex achieves stable performance close to the
middle of the distribution of results.
6.2 Coin Game
We summarise our experimental results in the Coin Game envi-
ronment. To examine the scalability of LOLA learning rules, we
compare NL-PG vs. NL-PG to LOLA-PG vs. LOLA-PG. Figure 5
demonstrates that NL-PG agents collect coins indiscriminately, cor-
responding to defection. In contrast, LOLA-PG agents learn to pick
up coins predominantly (around 80%) of their own colour, showing
that the LOLA learning rule leads to cooperation in the Coin Game.
Removing the assumption that agents can access the exact pa-
rameters of opponents, we examine LOLA agents with opponent
modeling (Section 4.4). Figure 5 demonstrates that without access
to the opponent’s policy parameters, LOLA agents with opponent
modeling pick up coins of their own colour around 60% of the time,
inferior to the performance of LOLA-PG agents. We emphasise
that with opponent modeling neither agent can recover the exact
policy parameters of the opponent, since there is a large amount
of redundancy in the neural network parameters. For example,
each agent could permute the weights of their fully connected lay-
ers. Opponent modeling introduces noise in the opponent agent’s
policy parameters, thus increasing the variance and bias of the
gradients (4.7) during policy updates, which leads to inferior per-
formance of LOLA-OM vs. LOLA-PG in Figure 5.
6.3 Exploitability of LOLA
In this section we address the exploitability of the LOLA learning
rule. We consider the IPD, where one can calculate the exact value
function of each agent given the policies. Thus, we can evaluate
the higher-order LOLA terms. We pitch a NL-Ex or LOLA-Ex agent
against NL-Ex, LOLA-Ex, and a 2nd-order LOLA agent. We compare
the normalised discounted return of each agent in all settings and
address the question of whether there is an arms race to incorporate
ever higher orders of LOLA correction terms.
Table 4 shows that a LOLA-Ex learner can achieve higher payouts
against NL-Ex. Thus, there is an incentive for either agent to switch
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Figure 5: The percentage of all picked up coins that match in colour (left) and the total points obtained per episode (right)
for a pair of naive learners using policy gradient (NL-PG), LOLA-agents (LOLA-PG), and a pair of LOLA-agents with opponent
modelling (LOLA-OM). Also shown is the standard error of themean (shading), based on 10 training runs.While LOLA-PG and
LOLA-OM agents learn to cooperate, LOLA-OM is less stable and obtains lower returns than LOLA-PG. Best viewed in colour.
from naive learning to first order LOLA. Furthermore, two LOLA-Ex
agents playing against each other both receive higher normalised
discounted reward than a LOLA-Ex agent playing against a NL-Ex.
This makes LOLA a dominant learning rule in the IPD compared to
naive learning. We further find that 2nd-order LOLA provides no
incremental gains when playing against a LOLA-Ex agent, leading
to a reduction in payouts for both agents. These experiments were
carried out with a δ of 0.5. While it is beyond the scope of this work
to prove that LOLA vs LOLA is a dominant learning rule in the
space of gradient-based rules, these initial results are encouraging.
NL-Ex LOLA-Ex 2nd-Order
NL-Ex (-1.99, -1.99) (-1.54, -1.28) (-1.46, -1.46)
LOLA-Ex (-1.28, -1.54) (-1.04, -1.04) (-1.14, -1.17)
Table 4: Higher-order LOLA results on the IPD. A LOLA-Ex
agent obtains higher normalised return compared to a NL-
Ex agent. However in this setting there is no incremental
gain from using higher-order LOLA in order to exploit an-
other LOLA agent in the IPD. In fact both agents do worse
with the 2nd order LOLA (incl. 3rd order corrections).
7 CONCLUSIONS & FUTUREWORK
Wepresented LearningwithOpponent-LearningAwareness (LOLA),
a learning method for multi-agent settings that considers the learn-
ing processes of other agents. We show that when both agents have
access to exact value functions and apply the LOLA learning rule,
cooperation emerges based on tit-for-tat in the infinitely repeated
iterated prisoners’ dilemma while independent naive learners de-
fect. We also find that LOLA leads to stable learning of the Nash
equilibrium in IMP. In our round-robin tournament against other
multi-agent learning algorithms we show that exact LOLA agents
achieve the highest average returns on the IPD and respectable per-
formance on IMP. We also derive a policy gradient-based version
of LOLA, applicable to a deep RL setting. Experiments on the IPD
and IMP demonstrate similar learning behavior to the setting with
exact value function.
In addition, we scale the policy gradient-based version of LOLA
to the Coin Game, a multi-step game that requires deep recurrent
policies. LOLA agents learn to cooperate, as agents pick up coins
of their own colour with high probability while naive learners pick
up coins indiscriminately. We further remove agents’ access to
the opponent agents’ policy parameters and replace with opponent
modeling.While less reliable, LOLA agents with opponentmodeling
also learn to cooperate.
We briefly address the exploitability of LOLA agents. Empirical
results show that in the IPD both agents are incentivised to use
LOLA, while higher order exploits show no further gain.
In the future, we would like to continue to address the exploitabil-
ity of LOLA, when adversarial agents explicitly aim to take advan-
tage of a LOLA learner using global search methods rather than
just gradient-based methods. Just as LOLA is a way to exploit a
naive learner, there should be means of exploiting LOLA learners
in turn, unless LOLA is itself an equilibrium learning strategy.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This project has received funding from the European Research
Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research
and innovation programme (grant agreement number 637713) and
from the National Institutes of Health (grant agreement number
R01GM114311). It was also supported by the Oxford-Google Deep-
Mind Graduate Scholarship and a generous equipment grant from
NVIDIA. We would like to thank Jascha Sohl-Dickstein, David Bal-
duzzi, Karl Tuyls, Marc Lanctot, Michael Bowling, Ilya Sutskever,
Bob McGrew, and Paul Cristiano for fruitful discussion. We would
like to thank Michael Littman for providing feedback on an early
version of the manuscript. We would like to thank our reviewers
for constructive and thoughtful feedback.
REFERENCES
[1] Robert M Axelrod. 2006. The evolution of cooperation: revised edition. Basic books.
[2] Mariusz Bojarski, Davide Del Testa, Daniel Dworakowski, Bernhard Firner, Beat
Flepp, Prasoon Goyal, Lawrence D Jackel, Mathew Monfort, Urs Muller, Jiakai
Zhang, et al. 2016. End to end learning for self-driving cars. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1604.07316 (2016).
[3] Michael Bowling and Manuela Veloso. 2002. Multiagent learning using a variable
learning rate. Artificial Intelligence 136, 2 (2002), 215–250.
[4] Ronen I. Brafman and Moshe Tennenholtz. 2003. Efficient Learning Equilibrium.
In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, Vol. 9. 1635–1643.
[5] George W Brown. 1951. Iterative solution of games by fictitious play. (1951).
[6] Lucian Busoniu, Robert Babuska, and Bart De Schutter. 2008. A comprehensive
survey of multiagent reinforcement learning. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man,
And Cybernetics-Part C: Applications and Reviews, 38 (2), 2008 (2008).
[7] Doran Chakraborty and Peter Stone. 2014. Multiagent learning in the presence
of memory-bounded agents. Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems 28, 2
(2014), 182–213.
[8] Caroline Claus and Craig Boutilier. 1998. The dynamics of reinforcement learning
in cooperative multiagent systems. AAAI/IAAI 1998 (1998), 746–752.
[9] Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. 2007. AWESOME: A general multiagent
learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against
stationary opponents. Machine Learning 67, 1-2 (2007), 23–43.
[10] JacobWCrandall andMichael A Goodrich. 2011. Learning to compete, coordinate,
and cooperate in repeated games using reinforcement learning. Machine Learning
82, 3 (2011), 281–314.
[11] Abhishek Das, Satwik Kottur, José MF Moura, Stefan Lee, and Dhruv Batra. 2017.
Learning Cooperative Visual Dialog Agents with Deep Reinforcement Learning.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.06585 (2017).
[12] Jakob Foerster, Yannis M Assael, Nando de Freitas, and Shimon Whiteson. 2016.
Learning to communicate with deep multi-agent reinforcement learning. In
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems. 2137–2145.
[13] Jakob Foerster, Gregory Farquhar, Triantafyllos Afouras, Nantas Nardelli, and
Shimon Whiteson. 2018. Counterfactual Multi-Agent Policy Gradients. In AAAI.
[14] Jakob Foerster, Nantas Nardelli, Gregory Farquhar, Philip Torr, Pushmeet Kohli,
Shimon Whiteson, et al. 2017. Stabilising experience replay for deep multi-agent
reinforcement learning. In 34th International Conference of Machine Learning.
[15] Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole. 1991. Game theory, 1991. Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts 393 (1991), 12.
[16] Robert Gibbons. 1992. Game theory for applied economists. Princeton University
Press.
[17] Johannes Heinrich and David Silver. 2016. Deep reinforcement learning from
self-play in imperfect-information games. arXiv preprint arXiv:1603.01121 (2016).
[18] Pablo Hernandez-Leal and Michael Kaisers. 2017. Learning against sequential
opponents in repeated stochastic games. (2017).
[19] Pablo Hernandez-Leal, Michael Kaisers, Tim Baarslag, and Enrique Munoz de
Cote. 2017. A Survey of Learning in Multiagent Environments: Dealing with
Non-Stationarity. arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.09183 (2017).
[20] Max Kleiman-Weiner, Mark K Ho, Joseph L Austerweil, Michael L Littman, and
Joshua B Tenenbaum. 2016. Coordinate to cooperate or compete: abstract goals
and joint intentions in social interaction. In COGSCI.
[21] Marc Lanctot, Vinicius Zambaldi, Audrunas Gruslys, Angeliki Lazaridou, Karl
Tuyls, Julien Perolat, David Silver, and Thore Graepel. 2017. A Unified Game-
Theoretic Approach to Multiagent Reinforcement Learning. InAdvances in Neural
Information Processing Systems (NIPS).
[22] Angeliki Lazaridou, Alexander Peysakhovich, and Marco Baroni. 2016. Multi-
agent cooperation and the emergence of (natural) language. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1612.07182 (2016).
[23] King Lee and K Louis. 1967. The Application of Decision Theory and Dynamic
Programming to Adaptive Control Systems. Ph.D. Dissertation.
[24] Joel Z Leibo, Vinicius Zambaldi, Marc Lanctot, JanuszMarecki, and Thore Graepel.
2017. Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas. In
Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems.
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 464–
473.
[25] Adam Lerer and Alexander Peysakhovich. 2017. Maintaining cooperation in
complex social dilemmas using deep reinforcement learning. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1707.01068 (2017).
[26] Michael L Littman. 2001. Friend-or-foe Q-learning in general-sum games. In
ICML, Vol. 1. 322–328.
[27] Ryan Lowe, YiWu, Aviv Tamar, Jean Harb, Pieter Abbeel, and IgorMordatch. 2017.
Multi-Agent Actor-Critic for Mixed Cooperative-Competitive Environments.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.02275 (2017).
[28] R Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa. 1957. Games and Decisions: Introduction
and Critical Survey. (1957).
[29] Richard Mealing and Jonathan Shapiro. 2015. Opponent Modelling by
Expectation-Maximisation and Sequence Prediction in Simplified Poker. IEEE
Transactions on Computational Intelligence and AI in Games (2015).
[30] Richard Mealing and Jonathan L Shapiro. 2013. Opponent Modelling by Sequence
Prediction and Lookahead in Two-Player Games.. In ICAISC (2). 385–396.
[31] Luke Metz, Ben Poole, David Pfau, and Jascha Sohl-Dickstein. 2016. Unrolled
generative adversarial networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.02163 (2016).
[32] Igor Mordatch and Pieter Abbeel. 2017. Emergence of Grounded Compositional
Language in Multi-Agent Populations. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.04908 (2017).
[33] Enrique Munoz de Cote and Michael L. Littman. 2008. A Polynomial-time Nash
Equilibrium Algorithm for Repeated Stochastic Games. In 24th Conference on
Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI’08). http://uai2008.cs.helsinki.fi/UAI_
camera_ready/munoz.pdf
[34] Shayegan Omidshafiei, Jason Pazis, Christopher Amato, Jonathan P How, and
John Vian. 2017. Deep Decentralized Multi-task Multi-Agent RL under Partial
Observability. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.06182 (2017).
[35] William H Press and Freeman J Dyson. 2012. Iterated PrisonerâĂŹs Dilemma
contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 109, 26 (2012), 10409–10413.
[36] Neil C Rabinowitz, Frank Perbet, H Francis Song, Chiyuan Zhang, SM Es-
lami, and Matthew Botvinick. 2018. Machine Theory of Mind. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1802.07740 (2018).
[37] B Myerson Roger. 1991. Game theory: analysis of conflict. (1991).
[38] Stéphane Ross, Geoffrey J Gordon, and J Andrew Bagnell. 2011. No-regret reduc-
tions for imitation learning and structured prediction. In In AISTATS. Citeseer.
[39] Tuomas W Sandholm and Robert H Crites. 1996. Multiagent reinforcement
learning in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Biosystems 37, 1-2 (1996), 147–166.
[40] Sainbayar Sukhbaatar, Rob Fergus, et al. 2016. Learning multiagent communica-
tion with backpropagation. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems.
2244–2252.
[41] Richard S Sutton and Andrew G Barto. 1998. Reinforcement learning: An intro-
duction. Vol. 1. MIT press Cambridge.
[42] Richard S Sutton, David A McAllester, Satinder P Singh, Yishay Mansour, et al.
1999. Policy gradient methods for reinforcement learning with function approxi-
mation.. In NIPS, Vol. 99. 1057–1063.
[43] William Uther and Manuela Veloso. 1997. Adversarial reinforcement learning.
Technical Report. Technical report, Carnegie Mellon University, 1997. Unpub-
lished.
[44] Ronald J Williams. 1992. Simple statistical gradient-following algorithms for
connectionist reinforcement learning. Machine learning 8, 3-4 (1992), 229–256.
[45] Michael Wunder, Michael L Littman, and Monica Babes. 2010. Classes of multia-
gent q-learning dynamics with epsilon-greedy exploration. In Proceedings of the
27th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML-10). 1167–1174.
[46] Chongjie Zhang and Victor R Lesser. 2010. Multi-Agent Learning with Policy
Prediction.. In AAAI.
[47] Martin Zinkevich, AmyGreenwald, andMichael L Littman. 2006. Cyclic equilibria
in Markov games. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems. 1641–
1648.
Learning with Opponent-Learning Awareness
Supplementary Material
1
ar
X
iv
:1
70
9.
04
32
6v
4 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 19
 Se
p 2
01
8
A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of Second-Order derivative
In this section, we derive the second order derivatives of LOLA in the policy gradient
setting. Recall that an episode of horizon T is
τ = (s0, u
1
0, u
2
0, r
1
0, r
2
0, ..., sT , u
1
T , u
2
T , r
1
T , r
2
T )
and the corresponding discounted return for agent a at timestep t isRat (τ) =
∑T
l=t γ
l−tral .
We denote Epi1,pi2,τ as the expectation taken over both agents’ policy and the episode
τ . Then,
∇θ1∇θ2 Epi1,pi2,τ R10(τ) = ∇θ1∇θ2 Eτ
[
R10(τ) ·
T∏
l=0
pi1(u1l |sl,θ1) ·
T∏
l=0
pi2(u2l |sl,θ2)
]
= Eτ
R10(τ) ·
(
∇θ1
( T∏
l=0
pi1(u1l |sl,θ1)
))(∇θ2( T∏
l=0
pi2(u2l |sl,θ2)
))T
= Eτ
R10(τ) ·
(
∇θ1
(∏T
l=0 pi
1(u1l |sl,θ1)
)∏T
l=0 pi
1(u1l |sl,θ1)
)(
∇θ2
(∏T
l=0 pi
2(u2l |sl,θ2)
)∏T
l=0 pi
2(u2l |sl,θ2)
)T
·
T∏
l=0
pi1(u1l |sl,θ1) ·
T∏
l=0
pi2(u2l |sl,θ2)
]
= Epi1,pi2,τ
R10(τ) ·
(
∇θ1
(∏T
l=0 pi
1(u1l |sl,θ1)
)∏T
l=0 pi
1(u1l |sl,θ1)
)(
∇θ2
(∏T
l=0 pi
2(u2l |sl,θ2)
)∏T
l=0 pi
2(u2l |sl,θ2)
)T
= Epi1,pi2,τ
R10(τ) ·
(
∇θ1 log
( T∏
l=0
pi1(u1l |sl,θ1)
))(∇θ2 log ( T∏
l=0
pi2(u2l |sl,θ2)
))T
= Epi1,pi2,τ
[
R10(τ) ·
(∑T
l=0
∇θ1 log pi1(u1l |sl,θ1)
)(∑T
l=0
∇θ2 log pi2(u2l |sl,θ2)
)T]
.
The second equality is due to pil is only a function of θl. The third equality is multiply
and divide the probability of the episode τ . The fourth equality factors the probability
of the episode τ into the expectationEpi1,pi2,τ . The fifth and sixth equalities are standard
policy gradient operations.
Similar derivations lead to the the following second order cross-term gradient for a
single reward of agent 1 at time t
∇θ1∇θ2 Epi1,pi2,τ r1t = Epi1,pi2,τ
[
r1t ·
(∑t
l=0
∇θ1 log pi1(u1l |sl,θ1)
)(∑t
l=0
∇θ2 log pi2(u2l |sl,θ2)
)T]
.
Sum the rewards over t,
∇θ1∇θ2 Epi1,pi2,τ R10(τ) = Epi1,pi2,τ
[∑T
t=0
γtr1t ·
(∑t
l=0
∇θ1 log pi1(u1l |sl,θ1)
)(∑t
l=0
∇θ2 log pi2(u2l |sl,θ2)
)T]
,
2
which is the 2nd order term in the Methods Section.
A.2 Derivation of the exact value function in the Iterated Prison-
ers’ dilemma and Iterated Matching Pennies
In both IPD and IMP the action space consists of 2 discrete actions. The state consists
of the union of the last action of both agents. As such there are a total of 5 possible
states, 1 state being the initial state, s0, and the other 4 the 2 x 2 states depending on
the last action taken.
As a consequence the policy of each agent can be represented by 5 parameters,θa,the
probabilities of taking action 0 in each of these 5 states. In the case of the IPD these
parameters correspond to the probability of cooperation in s0, CC, CD, DC and DD:
pia(C|s0) = θa,0, pia(D|s0) = 1− θa,0,
pia(C|CC) = θa,1, pia(D|CC) = 1− θa,1,
pia(C|CD) = θa,2, pia(D|CD) = 1− θa,2,
pia(C|DC) = θa,3, pia(D|DC) = 1− θa,3,
pia(C|DD) = θa,4, pia(D|DD) = 1− θa,4, a ∈ {1, 2}.
We denote θa = (θa,0, θa,1, θa,2, θa,3, θa,4).
In these games the union of pi1 and pi2 induces a state transition function P (s′|s) =
P (u|s). Denote the distribution of s0 as p0:
p0 =
(
θ1,0θ2,0, θ1,0(1− θ2,0), (1− θ1,0)θ2,0, (1− θ1,0)(1− θ2,0))T ,
the payout vector as
r1 = (−1,−3, 0,−2)T and r2 = (−1, 0,−3,−2)T ,
and the transition matrix is
P =
[
θ1θ2, θ1(1− θ2), (θ1 − 1)θ2, (1− θ1)(1− θ2)]
Then V1, V2 can be represented as
V 1(θ1,θ2) = pT0
(
r1 +
∑∞
t=1
γtP tr1
)
V 2(θ1,θ2) = pT0
(
r2 +
∑∞
t=1
γtP tr2
)
.
Since γ < 1 and P is a stochastic matrix, the infinite sum converges and
V 1(θ1,θ2) = pT0
I
I− γP r
1,
V 2(θ1,θ2) = pT0
I
I− γP r
2,
where I is the identity matrix.
An equivalent derivation holds for the Iterated Matching Pennies game with r1 =
(−1, 1, 1,−1)T and r2 = −r1.
3
A.3 Figures
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Figure 1: Shown is the probability of cooperation in the prisoners dilemma (a) and the
probability of heads in the matching pennies game (b) at the end of 50 training runs for
both agents as a function of state under naive learning (left) and LOLA (middle) when
using the exact gradients of the value function. Also shown is the average return per
step for naive and LOLA (right)
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Figure 2: Same as Figure A.3, but using the policy gradient approximation for all terms.
Clearly results are more noisy by qualitatively follow the results of the exact method.
5
